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Enhancing System Resilience Through Decentralized Control Loops: Separating Bounded Fault Tolerance from Network-Level Resilience
Table 1. Structural conditions for resilience in decentralized control. Each conditionis valid only for the disturbance model against which it was derived.
| Property | Disturbance model | Structural condition | Verification evidence | Key sources |
| Bounded fault tolerance | Isolated loop outage | Steady-state gain condition | Gain matrix / passivity / sector-bound test | Grosdidier and Morari (1986); Campo and Morari (1994); Zhang et al. (2002); Bao et al. (2003) |
| Consensus under silent node | Node or link goes silent | Graph connectivity | Communication graph remains connected | Simpson-Porco et al. (2015); Bidram et al. (2013, 2014) |
| Consensus under compromise | Up to F compromised nodes | 2F+1 neighbors per normal node | Neighbor-redundancy verification | LeBlanc et al. (2013) |
| Distributed optimization under faults | Bounded faulty or adversarial agents | Minimum redundancy condition | Redundancy characterization | Gupta and Vaidya (2020) |
| Networked control stability | Network-induced delay | Delay margin | Delay threshold relative to process dynamics | Hespanha et al. (2007) |
| Distributed MPC | Inter-controller exchange delay | Sampling-interval completion | Timing verification | Christofides et al. (2013) |